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"The proposition that freedom of trade is on the whole eco-
nomically more beneficial than protection is one of the most
fundamental propositions economic theory has to offer for
the guidance of economic policy." Based on this proposition
JOHNSON wrote his classical paper on the cost of protection
as a critique on a myriad of counterarguments for protec-
tion. Today, not many of the cases for protection have sur-
vived in scientific discourse. Yet, tariffs or other trade
barriers are a prevalent feature of world trade and it seems
that the pressure to promote free trade leads merely to a
substitution from - easily observable - tariffs to disguised
non-tariff barriers.
In this paper a partial equilibrium model explaining the
existence of protective measures a tariffs or non-tariff
barriers (NTB's) is formulated. Through a model with endoge-
nous determination of protection the factors influencing the
level of protection can be determined. The social cost of
protection then consists of the well-known welfare triangles
and the cost of lobbying. Since these results can not be
computed directly, a comparative static analysis will indi-
cate .the behavior of the relevant variables in equilibrium.
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Of course, this analysis rests on a history of research on
international trade and political economy of protection.
Three main research areas should be mentioned; the litera-
ture on the social cost of protection, the theory of endoge-
nous tariff formation, and the new political economy.
The classical analysis for the determination of social costs
of protection is JOHNSON'S (1960) "The Cost of Protection
2
and the Scientific Tariff" . Protection can be represented
by the difference between the domestic and the world market- 2 -
price for a commodity (p - p ). Given such a price differen-
tial, the cost of protection is measured as the sum of the
areas L. and L».
Depending on the system of protection the area S is partly
or completely social cost. In the case of a tariff it repre-
sents tariff revenues, i.e. it is no cost, provided tariff
collection is costless. For voluntary export restriction,
e.g., S is a social cost.
The area T is, according to JOHNSON, a transfer from consu-
mers to producers but no social cost. This has been ques-
tioned by TULLOCK (1967) based on the premise, that govern-
ments will not impose tariffs of their own, since they are
welfare reducing. Rather, they have to be pressured to do so
by special interest groups.-3 -
"One would anticipate that the domestic producers would
invest resources in lobbying for the tariff until the
marginal return on the last dollar so spent was equal
to its likely return producing the transfer. There
might also be other interests trying to prevent the
transfer and putting resources into influencing the
government in the other direction. These expenditures,
which may simply offset each other to some extent, are
purely wasteful from the standpoint of society as a
whole; they are spent not in increasing wealth, but in
attempts to transfer or resist transfer of wealth. I
can suggest no way of measuring these expenditures, but
the potential returns are large, and it would be quite
4
surprising if the investment was not also sizable."
The same view, although in a slightly different context, has
been taken by KRUEGER (1974).
"... rent seeking is one part of an economic activity,
such a distribution or production, and part of the
firm's resources are devoted to the activity."
Since KRUEGER only analyses the distribution of existing
rents, the social cost of creating rents have to be added to
Krueger's cost of rent-seeking. McCULLOCH (1979), therefore,
sees competitive efforts from different interest groups to
influence governments for protective measures.
"The net effect is to turn economic activity away from
the production of goods and services available to the
final consumer and toward attempts to influence the
legislative and adminstrative process ... The loss thus
incurred is probably far greater than any of the pre-
sent estimates of the cost of protection; for every
applicant, many others who have made similar invest-
ments have been turned away."- 4 -
All these authors have two things in common. They emphasize
the need to treat lobbying just like any other economic
activity, and they are rather nebulous when it comes to
estimating the probable social cost of these activities.
This paper is an attempt to clarify the proper measurement
of social costs under the premise employed by these authors.
But at the same time it ignores many aspects which have been
investigated in the literature of the so called "New Politi-
cal Economy".
Lobbying and endogenous tariff formation in the spirit of
the "New Political Economy" have been investigated by
BROCK/MAGEE (1978, 1980) and by FINDLAY/WELLISZ (1980). Both
approaches use general equlibrium models, but with different
emphasis on certain aspects of the politico-economic pro-
cess.
BROCK and MAGEE construct a political equilibrium with two
politicians, who maximize their respective probability of
becoming reelected. The probability of beeing reelected is
an increasing function of the own campaign contributions and
the promised protection of the other politician. It is in-
versely related to his own level of promised protection and
the the other politician's compaign contributions, which are
assumed to be financed from lobbying expenditures. There are
two lobbies; an anti-protectionist consumer lobby and a
protectionist producer lobby. Consumers can not organize
themselves effectively so that they can influence the poli-
ticians through their votes only. Those producers, however,
who are able to form an effective lobby, will obtain protec-
tion through campaign contributions.- 5 -
Equilibrium is reached through a two stage maximization.
First, the lobbies determine their campaign contributions as
a function of the tariff promises of the politicians by
equating marginal cost and marginal revenue. Although this
is not clear, there does not seem to be competition between
lobbies. In the second step the two politicians face a non-
cooperative game.' Each politician maximizes the probability
of beeing elected, given the campaign contributions of the
lobbies as functions of the tariff stands of the politi-




where t. tariff position of politician i
P( ) probability of politician i for being
elected.
x.(t,,t?) contributions of lobbies to politician i,
given tariff position t, and t?.
The resulting Nash-equilibrium is then analysed with respect
to its stability and comparative static properties.
With such a model BROCK and MAGEE have shifted the focus
mainly to the political sphere. The competition of politi-
cians determines the final outcome, whereas the lobbies are
inactive except for their decision over the supply functions
of campaign contributions. Especially, the strategic inter-
dependence between protectionist and anti-protectionist
lobbies is left out of the model.
The model of endogenous tariff formation by FINDLAY and
WELLISZ (1980) represents a shift in the opposite direction.
The political process is not constructed explicitly. Rather,- 6 -
the result of political decisions is a tariff rate which is
an increasing function of the resources spent by the protec-
tion seeking group and a decreasing function of the protec-
tion opposing group. In a specific factors general equili-
brium model the owners of these factors constitute opposing
interest groups lobbying for, or against, a tariff. The
resulting non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium uniquely deter-
mines a tariff level and the deadweight loss measured
through resources spent for lobbying. Since the equilibrium
tariff can be between zero and a prohibitive level depending
on the relative strength of the interest groups, it clearly
follows that the social cost due to lobbying are, in gene-
ral, not an increasing function of the tariff level.
The more empirically oriented studies of the "New Political
Economy" do not have very much in common with the abstract
conceptual models above but the idea of a political market
for protection. This research tests different variables for
their potential in explaining the level and/or the pattern
of protection.
Most authors work - implicitly or explicitly - with a poli-
tical market for protection with import-competing producers
as demanders and a government as the supplier of protection
[ANDERSON/BALDWIN (1981), pg. 2-3; GLISMANN/WEISS (1980),
pg. 1]. Demand for protection becomes effective through
industry lobbies which "will select the level of lobbying
expenditures which yields the degree of protection that
maximizes the difference between its producer surplus gains
and the costs of lobbying." [ANDERSON/BALDWIN (1981), Pg.
4]. The supply of protection is determined by a DOWNSian
politician [DOWNS (1957)], who maximizes his probability of
reelection by financing his campaign with funds from lob-
bies.- 7 -
With this general framework in mind, proxies are sought
which are supposed to capture determinants of the pattern of
protection. ANDERSON and BALDWIN (1981) have collected seve-
ral country studies following this approach. Instead of
discussing the appropriatness of the choice of variables and
the estimation, we will make some conceptional remarks which
have influenced the formulation of the model developed in
this paper.
If one accepts the existence of a political market for pro-
tection, then it is natural to model the demand as well as
the supply side as a maximization process. The resulting
equilibria represent the simultaneous outcomes of this maxi-
mization. Before demand for protection appears on the poli-
tical market industries must form a lobby to promote their
protectionist interests. This formation requires industry
specific organization costs. OLSON (1965) has provided va-
luable insight in this aspect. Given the process of lobby
formation, costs and benefits of protection to an industry
have to be determined. On the political market, then, se-
veral lobbies compete for protection thus determining ex-
ternal costs of protection. On the supply side a model of
the political decision process should be formulated of which
the political market for protection is a part. It goes
without saying, that such an ideal approach can not be rea-
lized. The empirical studies in the spirit of the "new poli-
tical economy" have chosen to focus of the outcomes without
exact examination of the comparative static or dynamic pro-
perties of the processes determining these outcomes.
It is our suspicion, however, that some of the hypotheses
entering the estimation for the determination of patterns of
protection are not investigated deeply enough with respect
to their internal rationality and with respect to their- 8 -
compatibility. This paper is an attempt to analyse some of
the issue mentioned above. Before we outline the subsequent
sections, a summary of topics excluded from the analysis is
in order.
The internal formation of lobbies as well as their costs of
organizing, communicating, policing and distributing are
ignored. With this assumption it is possible to view an
industry and its lobby as identical units with a well-de-
fined objective function. Then the demand side of the poli-
tical market can be formulated in a straightforward manner.
The level of abstraction is even higher on the supply side.
Due to the lack of an economic theory of political decision
processes the form of the supply function of protection will
be determined on plausibility arguments instead of a model
of the political process. We feel, however, that results
would not change significantly, if the model would be sup-
plemented by a complete optimization problem of politi-
8
cians.
In such a restricted model the determination of protection,
measured as the price difference between world market and
domestic prices, is our main concern. When possible, we
indicate the welfare effects of the endogenously determined
level of protection, i.e. the social cost of protection. Two
questions will be answered in the subsequent models. Given
some, parametrically determined, political situation, what
is the relation between the commodity production decision
9
and the lobbying expenditures of an industry , and what are
the effects of parameter changes? The parameters considered
are the world market price level, the political situation as
far as protection is concerned, and the technology of commo-
dity production. The second question addresses the determi-
nants of the pattern of protection and its comparative sta-
tic properties.- 9 -
In the next section a simple model of a simultanous lobbying
and production decision of one industry is formulated. The
political situation is condensed in a "lobby cost function"
which represents the lobbying expenditures necessary to
obtain a specific tariff rate. The optimal tariff rate -
from the view of the industry - is derived through profit
maximization. In a quadratic example the situation is illu-
strated graphically, making the interdependency between
commodity and lobbying decisions transparent. The subsequent
comparative static analysis shows some surprising results.
In a purely economic argumentation the optimal tariff rate
increases with rising world market prices and improved tech-
nology. Or, if it is put the other way around, higher pro-
tection with falling world market prices or relatively de-
clining technologies cannot be explained by purely monetary
arguments.
A duality approach is used to explain the pattern of protec-
tion. Two industries compete on the political market for
protection. In a Nash-equilibrium framework optimal tariff
rates are determined. It is assumed that lobbies invest only
in the protection of their own industry, but not against
protection of other industries. The comparative static
analysis shows, that the reaction functions of both indus-
tries are negatively sloped. Hence, parameter changes have
reciprocal results on the two industries. That is, a para-
meter change in industry i will have the effect on that
industry as described in the one-industry model; the effect
on the other industry is just the opposite.- 10 -
THE ONE-INDUSTRY CASE
We first investigate the determination of protection simul-
taneously with the production decision in a partial-equili-
brium framework with one industry. The small country assump-
tion is valid so that the .supply of the rest of the world is
perfectly elastic and the world market price p is given.
The industry produces one good x and invests in lobbying to
obtain a tariff rate
t =
where p denotes the domestic price of good x.
The supply of protection, measured through t, is determined
by a government or politicians. The decision makers in the
government have, besides some private ethical and monetary
interests, one major objective, namely to stay in power by
winning the next election. Therefore, one can describe their
objective as maximizing the probality of getting a majority
of votes. Voters, on the other side, are influenced in their
voting decision by the relative size of the campaigns of
politicians and by their own perception of their well-being
as far as it is related to governmental policy. Both factors
go in the same direction; raising campaign funds lead to a
more effective presentation of the success of the govern-
ment, and - positively correlated with it - higher perceived
well-being leads to more votes for the incumbents.
Since most voters are consumers, the well-being of a voter
can be approximated by the sum of consumers surplus in his
different consumption activities which depends on his income
and domestic prices. But domestic prices themselves are- 11 -
partly determined by the protection granted by the govern-
ment. Therefore, any protection of a commodity granted by
the government will have a slight effect on the consumer-
price-level and leads, ceteris paribus, to a loss of votes.
Such losses, however, can be compensated by more than pro-
portionate increases in campaign expenditures [ANDERSON/
BALDWIN (1981), pg. 10.J
1
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Since campaigns are to some extent - this differs from coun-
try to country - financed by contributions, e.g. from indu-
stry lobbies, the supply function for protection can be
derived from the politician's objective to win the next
election. In order to receive a majority of votes, an incum-
bent politician needs high utility levels of voters, that
is, among other things, low tariff rates or higher tariff
rates with even higher campaign funds. Hence, the supply
function for protection
t = T(m), m = contributions
will be concave.
From the view of an industry, the supply function for pro-
tection of the government looks like a cost function. We
construct this cost function s(t) simply by inverting the
supply function T(m), i.e.
s(t) =
Therefore, it becomes increasingly costly for any lobby to
obtain additional protection. Hence s(t) is convex and - in
addition - assumed to be at least twice differentiable, i.e.
|| = s'(t) > 0; ||| = s"(t) > 0.- 12 -
For simplicity reasons it is assumed, that there are no
fixed costs, i.e. s(o)=0. This is no severe restriction,
since fixed costs s(o)>0 could be considered as an ex ante
12 reduction of the transfer T
In order to avoid unnecessary complications it is convenient
to investigate only circumstances which do not result in
eliminating all imports. Again, this is not a severe assump-
tion, since, in terms of the industries lobbying decisions,
the inclusion of prohibitive protection would only result in
an upper bound on lobbying once imports have ceased to
exist. In terms of the production decision, however, things
might become more complicated under prohibitive protective
measures. The industry could now act as a monopolist, if it
consists of just one firm, or as a cartel or cooperative
oligopoly in case of a relatively small number of firms in
the industry. This would involve additional social costs
which are not subject of this study.
The commodity production technology can be described by a
convex, at least twice differentiable cost function c(x),
i.e.
- cMx) > 0; |1§- c"(x) > 0.
The profit maximization problem of the industry can be for-
mulated as
(1) max p(l+t)x - c(x) - s(t).
x,t
The necessary conditions for a maximum are
(2) p(l+t*) - c
1(x*) = 0




where (x*,t*) are the optimal output and protection levels.
For sufficiency the following conditions must hold:
(4) c"(x*) > 0
(5) c"(x*) s" (t*) - p
2 > 0.
(4) follows from the assumptions and (5) requires the slope
of the marginal cost curves to be sufficiently large.
From (2) the supply of x as a function of the domestic price
can be derived as the inverse of
(6) p = c
1(x).
The determination of x* as a function of the world market
price p follows from equations (2) and (3) simultaneously.
Since the two equations can not be solved explicitly for
x*(p) and t* (p), the results are illustrated by an example.
A QUADRATIC EXAMPLE
Let the cost functions be of the form
c (x) = j ax
2
s(t) = \ bt
2
with a > 0, b > 0.
The industry will maximize profits, i.e.
IT (x,t,) = p(l+t)x - ^ ax
2 - -^ bt
2.- 14 -
The necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum are
(7) p(l+t*) - ax* = 0
(8) px* - bt* = 0
(9) ab -p
2 > 0.
With a > 0, b > 0 all conditions for a maximum are met and
















The supply function as a function of the domestic price
p=p(l+t*), i.e. given the optimal lobbying t*, is
(12) xQ(p) = i p.
In order to determine x* and t* graphically, we need equa-









In Figure 2 the optimal supply x* for a given world market
price w
is determined by x(pw). The domestic price
p=p (1+t*) is given by the intersection of x* with the mar-
ginal cost curve x(p). Without lobbying the supply of the
domestic producers would be x < x* at the world market price
p . This also holds for the general case of equations (1)
through (5) . The details are shown in the appendix (Lem-
ma 1).
In the quadratic example it is easy to show, how much of the
redistribution from consumers to domestic producers is lost
because of lobbying activities. The area T=p pLF is the
consumer surplus lost - due to protection - which goes to
the domestic producer. The producer, however, has lobbying
cost of s(t*) . Then the proportion of the area T which is
lost is equal to s(t*)/T(p).- 16 -
From the definition of s(t) we have the optimal lobby cost
i





The area T is determined as
(14) T(p) = px*(p) - Pwx&(p) - dx
xo
Since the marginal cost curve goes through the origin and is
linear and together with
equation (14) reduces to
(16) T(p) = \ [p(l+t*(p))x*(p)-f
2]
After substituting equations (10) and (11) into (13) and





From (17) and the second order condition (9) one can imme-
diately see, that- 17 -
For the quadratic example we can summarize, that at least
half of the are T - the redistribution from consumers to
domestic producers - is used up for lobbying purposes. With
increasing world market prices lobby costs s(t*) rise rela-
tively faster than the gain from lobbying T.
The net gain T(p)-s[t*(p)], however, is still an increasing




(For the derivation see LEMMA 2)
Therefore producers will always increase their lobbying
efforts, when there is a rise in the world market price.
It is interesting to investigate in this example the rela-
tion between the technology in the production of x and the
social cost incurred through lobbying. Changes in production
technology can be represented by a variation of the parame-
ter a in the cost function cfxj^ax
2. If da<0, there has
been technical progress in the production of x.
From equations (10) and (11) the effect of technological
change on the optimal output and protection level x* and t*
can be determined as
9x*(p,a,b) -b
2p











The increase in output x* through an improvement in techno-
logy, -da, at constant world market prices can be decomposed
in two effects. First, there is, what may be called the pure
production effect. The decrease in a lowers the marginal
cost curve, i.e. moves the supply curve to the right. As one
can see in Figure 3, output of the industry will increase
from x* to x* , if there is no change in the protection t,
















The second effect on x* is due to a change in the optimal
protection t*. Although the lobby cost function remains the
same, i.e. there is a constant technology, the change in the
technology of producing the commodity x will affect the
lobby decision as follows. Through the shift of the marginal
cost curves of x from c
1 (a) to c
1 (a) the rent of the indus-
try through its lobby activity has increased from
p FLp (1+t) to p F'L'p (1+t). Hence the marginal revenue of
vf Vv W \w- 19 -
lobbying has become larger than its marginal costs and in
order to have equality the lobby activity has to be expan-
ded. The new optimal protection is represented by t. The
intersection of the world market price p with the curve
x(p,a) determines the new commodity output x* which, in
turn, determines through
the optimal protection t.
turn, determines through c' the domestic price p (1+t) and
Figure 3 shows immediately that with a technological im-
provement the redistribution from consumers to the industry
has increased from pwFLpw(l+t) to pwF'L"pw(l+€). The cost of
lobbying s(t*) has increased also, but at a faster rate,
since the cost function was assumed to be convex. In order
to determine the change in the ratio of lobby costs to the
s








By equation (21) an improvement in the technology of produ-
cing x will lead to an increase in the ratio of costs to
gain. Graphically this can be represented by an upward shift
of |;(p) in Figure 4.










The same analysis can be applied to changes in the "techno-
logy of creating protection". They describe exogenous chan-
ges in the government or the electorate. Better information
of voters about the costs of protection, e.g., will probably
decrease the governments willingness to grant protection.
From the viewpoint of the lobby this means that the protec-
tion obtained at some level of lobbying activity has de-
creased or, in other words, the technology of creating pro-
duction has deteriorated. Conversely, the election of a new
government which is more benevolent towards the interests of
a specific industry can be viewed as an improved technology
of lobbying from the standpoint of this industry. Without
interpreting too much into this, by a variation in b we try
to capture the effect of exogenous changes on the side of
supply protection.- 21 -
The sign of the change in the optimal commodity output x*
and the optimal protection t* due to changes in b can be















If a government becomes reluctant to grant protection the
optimal values of x* and t* will both decrease. As this is
not surprising, it is worthwhile to compare the working of a
change in b with a change in a graphically. Whereas Figure 3
shows, that a change in a shifts the curve x(p) as well as
the marginal cost curve c
1, a change in b does not affect
the marginal cost of production. In Figure 5 the optimal
values for db<0 are determined through a shift in x*(p,b)
alone. The optimal output x* increases from x* to x* and the
protection increases from t* to t*. Correspondingly the








The ratio of lobby costs to the gain of lobbying when there
is a change in b can be computed in the same manner as in
the case of a change in a.
3|(p,a,b) -2ap
2










Again, changes in the lobbying technology have the same sign
s (t*)
with respect to T , and T-s(t*) as changes in the produc-
tion technology.
Any reduction in the willingness to grant protection of
government or a bureaucracy will reduce the cost of redis-
tribution measured through s(t*). This cost reduction is
smaller than the decrease in the amount T redistributed so
that the net gain to producers T-s(t*) falls.
The General Results
Most results of the quadratic example carry over to the
general case. PROPOSITION 1 and LEMMA 1 in the appendix
confirm the graphical representation in Figure 2, i.e. the
supply function x(p) always lies above x(p). Also the net
surplus T-s(t*) is strictly positive (PROPOSITION 2).
The sign of effect of changes in the world market price is
the same as in the quadratic case (see PROPOSITION 3). Com-
modity supply x* together with the tariff rate t* increase.
Also net surplus from lobbying T-s(t*) increases. For the- 23 -
measurement of the social cost of protection, we do not know
which proportion of the area T in Figure 1 has to be regar-
ded as social cost when prices change. It seems to depend on
the relative steepness of the cost functions in commodity
production versus lobbying.
For the analysis of changes in the technology of production




Technological changes can be represented by parameter varia-
tion of h and g. Again the quadratic results are confirmed
with the exception of the change in s*/T. I.e., technical
progress in commodity production - or, eguivalently falling
input prices - yield higher optimal commodity supply, higher
lobbying, higher tariff rates, and a higher net surplus. The
results of a shift in the lobby cost function are not sur-
prising, since an increase in the parameter g can, e.g., be
interpreted as higher reluctance of politicians to grant
protection.
Since, in general, one can not empirically observe lobby
costs, the estimation of social costs of protection through
observation of the price difference between domestic and
world market prices beyond the welfare triangles is, not
facilitated through the above results. Potentially obser-
vable parameter variations do not give clear indication as
to the treatment of the area T traditionally considered as
redistribution. At least we know, that a good part of T is a
social cost and that this social cost becomes larger, if
fixed costs of lobbying are added.- 24 -
THE SEVERAL INDUSTRY CASE
In the previous section it was shown that an economic analy-
sis of lobbying decisions for protection can not be sepera-
ted from the simultaneous commodity production decision,
since costs and benefits from lobbying are functions of the
production decision. This has to be taken into account, when
the pattern of protection is analysed. Such an interdepen-
dency on the production side requires a specification of the
relation of industries on the commodity as well as the poli-
tical market. Unfortunately, all the different possibilities
can not be subsumed under one model.
In the following, we will present three typical situations
which are equal with respect to the political decision ma-
ker, but differ with respect to the relation between indus-
tries. Then the implications of two of the models will be
analysed; the third will be investigated in a subsequent
paper.
The first and easiest generalization might be called the
"independent industry" case. There are several industries
with their lobbies. Each industry produces a different com-
modity x, , (k=l,.., u), with a convex production technology.
The industries are independent by the assumption that their
products are sold on different markets and that there are no
substitution effects. With this restriction the focus is
solely on the interrelation of industry through their lobby-
ing activities. The political decision maker has increasing
political cost of overall protection. That is, lobby i's
protection is a concave, nondecreasing, function of its
lobbying expenditures m.. On the other hand, t. is a nonin-
creasing function of the expenditures of another lobby j.
Such a constellation forms a typical noncooperative game.- 25 -
The second model is more realistic in that the assumption of
independence of industries in the commodity sphere is drop-
ped. It is convenient to circumvent a modeling of the demand
side with consumers by assuming that the interdepence on the
commodity side is established through factor demands of one
industry for the output" of another industry. That is, both
industries lobby for protection of their respective outputs,
but the one industry which uses another protected industry's
output as an input will be hurt by the production of that
industry. This is a simple case of effective protection,
where the industry tries to compensate its negative effec-
tive protection through lobbying for protection of its own
products. The additional interdependence through the commo-
dity market will not alter the results of model in a signi-
ficant way.
One important implicit assumption is the exclusion of the
possibility for an industry to lobby against protection of -
as in our case - imputs which it uses in its production. One
reason lies in the empirical evidence supporting the hypo-
thesis that there is no interindustry lobbying against each
other. On the consumer side, i.e. of those who eventually
are hurt by protection, explicit lobbying against protection
can rarely be observed. Rather, there is the indirect pres-
sure of a loss of votes of disappointed consumers which has
been subsumed under the increasing political cost of protec-
tion assumption. Recently, some evidence indicating the
formation of anti-protectionist forces, however, suggests to
investigate the consequences of competition for and against
protection which is the purpose of the third model.
This third possible basic interaction between economic units
with respect to protection can best be modeled by having two
groups with antagonist interests. In a different context
BECKER (1983) had two pressure groups competing for redis-- 26 -
tribution. Similarly, we can take two industries competing
for and against protection. Let, e.g., there be an industry
i producing inputs for industry j. These inputs are protec-
ted so that cost for industry j rise. Contrary to the model
above, industry j now is assumed to lobby against protection
of industry i. Of course, the anti-protectionist lobby could
be composed of consumers as well without altering the struc-
ture of the models. Since such a model leads to rather com-
plicated issues of multiple noncooperative equilibria and
stability, it will be discussed in a subsequent paper.
The above mentioned models represent the three possible
cases of interaction between economic units in a politico-
economic situation. Instead of working with a large number
of industries, we only investigate the Nash-equilibrium
properties in a two industry framework. This simplification
seems justified, since in the comparative-static analysis
the effects of exogenous changes in one industry on the rest
of the economy can be determined by viewing the other indus-
tries as one "composite" group. Also indirect effects of
parameter changes in one industry through the reaction of
the other industries can be reduced to such a framework.
Therefore, in the following we analyse two industries i,j
with their production and lobby activities.
Whereas in the one lobby case the analysis was more intui-
tive when presented in terms of cost functions, here it
seems to be more convenient to formulate the model in terms
of production functions and their dual profit function. Of
course, the structure of the decision problem of an indus-
try and its lobby, remains identical.- 27 -
Both industries are assumed to have convex technologies of








where z is a vector of inputs and x, the commodity
produced by industry k.
Lobbying is determined like a production activity. Protec-
tion, measured through t with p = p(l+t), is produced with
inputs which, for convenience, we call money. I.e., each
industry spends money, m. and m., in order to produce t. and
t.. Again, the government is assumed to face increasing
political cost of protection for industry i as well as in-
dustry j. It therefore seems natural to make the following
assumptions.
(1) Protection t, of industry k (k=i,j) is a concave func-
tion of its money payments m, .
(2) Protection t. of industry i is a nonincreasing function
of the money payments m. of industry j and vice versa.
(1) is the same assumption as the convex cost function in
the one lobby case. (2) is a straightforward formalization
of increasing political cost of overall protection. If the
protection of one industry k increases, the increased poli-
tical cost of this protection result in a nonincreasing
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9mk
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and
3T . (m. ,m.) 3x . (m. ,m.
—i—1—3_ g o —3—i—L
9m. 3m.
D i
For 3T./3m.=O and 3r./3m.=O we are back to the original
model, since there is no interaction between lobbies.
For the subsequent derivations the sign of the cross-partial
3m.3m.
i 1
has to be determined also. It can be interpreted as the
effect of one additional dollar spent in industry j on the
marginal product of lobbying in industry i. Since there are
increasing political costs of protection it is plausible' to
assume a negative sign for the cross-partial.
The profit functions for industry i, resp. j, in the "inde-
pendent industry" case can now be written as
where v = input price.
The profit maximization problem for the two industries be
comes
max TT. (z. ,m. ,m.)
z. ,m. •"" •""
 x -
1
i' I- 29 -
and
max TT . (z . ,m. ,m.)
Zj,m.
The subsequent analysis^ becomes considerably simplified, if
the production and lobby decisions are separated. Let
max p,(l+t, ) f, (z,)-vz, -m,
JS. I\. A. J\ J\. J\.
Zk
k =
TT, (p, (l+tk) ) can be interpreted as the profit function with
exogenous tariff t,=t,(m. ,m .) . Having thus eliminated the
K JC 1 j
commodity decision, we can focus exclusively on the lobby
decisions of the two industries.
It is well-known that IT, (p, (1+t, ) ) is continuous for Pi^O*
v>0, linear-homogenous and convex in p, (1+t,) (see, e.g.,
McFADDEN (1978)). In addition we have by HOTELLINGS•s LEMMA
* (p (1+t,))
= x* , k =
where x? denotes the profit maximizing supply of commodi-
ty k.




with tk = Tk(mifm.), k=i,j- 30 -
The necessary conditions for a profit maximum are
3* 3x,




A = j P p
3[pk(l+tk)] 3mk 3pk(l+tk) 3m
2k.
Equation (28) can be written as
3T . (m. ,m.)




(30) x* p. ^ i 2 1 = 0
3
 3 3m.
These two equations are the implicit reaction functions of
the two industries.
The solution concept employed for this noncooperative game
of lobbying is a Nash-equilibrium. (m
:!
r,m'*) is a Nash-equi-
librium, if the following equations hold:
3x.(m*,m*)




(31) x* p.—^ ^ 1 = 0
1
 J 3m.- 31 -
Before the solution can be shown graphically, two more com-
putations are necessary. The slope of the reaction functions
of industry i and j are negative. To see this, let R.(m.,m.)
and R.(m.,m.) denote the implicit reaction functions of (29)
3










For a Nash-equilibrium with both industries lobbying, i.e.
m*>0, m*>0, (m*, m*.) must be a stable equilibrium. Stability
requires the absolute value of the slopes of the graph of R.
in Figure 8 to be larger than that of R. which is equivalent
to the requirement, that the Hessian of the equations (29)
14 and (30), A, has a positive sign.





One can immediately see, that the level of lobbying expendi-
tures in each industry is lower than in a situation with one
lobby only. In that case optimal lobbying expenditure is
determined by the intercept of R. with the vertical axis or
R. with the horizontal axis. Figure 8 also shows that lobby-
ing is a dominant strategy compared to the strategy of not
lobbying. In other words, tariff-seeking is not a Prisoner's
Dilemma problem.
We now turn to the comparative-static analysis of parameter
changes on the Nash-equilibrium levels of protection. Chan-
ges in world market prices, in production technology of an
industry, and changes in the political arena will be consi-
dered.
First, an increase (decrease) in p. will shift the reaction
function R.(m.,m.) upward (downward). This is obvious from
differentiation of (29).
3x* 9T. 3T.
- [p. (1+t. ) - + x? -^]
dm. dp.(1+t.) 3m. 3m.
—i = i i i i_ > o,
dp. A.
since A.<0 by the second-order condition for a profit maxi-
mum of industry i. The reaction function R.(m.,m.) will
remain unaffected, since in this model independence on the
commodity market was assumed.
The equilibrium changes dm^/dp. and dm^/dp. can be computed
using Cramer's Rule through differentiation of equations
(29) and (30). For a stable equilibrium the optimal lobbying
expenditures of industry i, m*, will increase with p. and
those of industry j, m*, will decrease, i.e. dm*/dp.>0 and- 33 -
dm*/dp.<0 (for the computation see PROPOSITION 7 in the
appendix). From the definition of the tariff functions
T.(m.,m.) and t.(m.,m.) it follows immediately that
3t*/9p.>0 and 3tt/3p.<0.
The seemingly paradoxical result of the one-industry case of
tariffs rising (falling) with increasing (decreasing) world
market prices carries over to the several-industry model. In
addition the industry whose world market price remained
constant will reduce its lobbying and receive a lower tariff
rate.
For the analysis of unequal technical progress in the two
industries a simple representation of technology is chosen.
The production functions are defined as
ak
>0-
The net revenue function of industry k becomes
irk (nu,m. , z^) = p^ (1+t^) a^f^ (z^) - vz^ - m^ .
Maximization over z, yields the profit function
The reaction functions have the same characteristics as
before and are of the form
3TT, 3T,
R, (m. ,m.) = a, p. . 1 = 0, k=i,j
k
 x ^ * *
 8P- 34 -
Technical progress in industry k, i.e. dot, >0, will shift the
reaction function to the right. Total differentiation of R,
w.r.t. m, and a, yields the desired result
9Tk
dmk ~
Pk imT tv. v 8
2^.
( iS iS ) > o
since Ak > 0 and
On the other hand, a change in the technology of one indus-
try will have no effect on the reaction of the other indus-
try. Differentiation of R. w.r.t. m. and a. and R. w.r.t. m.
and a. shows this.
The equilibrium changes of m* and m* follow directly from
the shifts of these reaction functions, i.e.
dm*
—- > 0 and
dmk 16




The results are illustrated graphically in Figure 7 for the
case of da.>0. The graph of R. (m.,m.) is shifted to the








The optimal lobbying expenditures of industry j falls from
m* to m* and those of industry i rise from m* to m* .
Correspondingly the tariff rate t. will rise, while t.
falls. On the commodity side the results coincide with those
of the one industry case. The supply of commodity xt in-
crease and x* decreases as one can see see from the reaction
functions R.(m.,m.) and R.(m.,m.).
We now turn to the analysis of political changes. Again, one
can choose from a myriad of different ways to model such
changes, each reflecting different aspects of the political
decision process with respect to protection. Three configu-
rations are more or less arbitrarily picked, which show the
effects of exogenous political changes on optimal lobbying,
protection, etc. All modifications amount to reformulations
of the protection functions
 TT.(*).- 36 -
The first modification is concerned with the "overall poli-
tical climate" towards protection in the society. Contrary
to theoretical results showing the Pareto-superiority of
free trade in most cases one can observe in some countries
or over some periods widespread agreement with protectionis-
tic policies. Whatever the reasons for such a climate - be
it "national pride" or lack of information about the social
cost of protection -, exogenous changes - e.g. induced by
new information provided to the general public - will affect
the optimal lobbying and the protection levels. In our two
industry model this can be included by writing the protec-
tion functions as
y>0.
y is simply a scaling factor, equal in both protection func-
tions. The larger y the easier, i.e. the cheaper, it is to
obtain protection. Suppose, e.g., the general public has
become informed about the considerable costs of protection
through the media. This will raise political costs of pro-
tection to the politicians. In our model it would amount to
a reduction of y.
The second case is concerned with the political preference
towards protecting certain sectors of the economy. In most
political discussions on protection, protecting jobs has
been a major issue and a successful strategy for obtaining
protection. Obviously, this is possible since a job saved
has a high political value despite its social netbenefits -
which may well be negative. Hence, industries which are
threatened, or at least appear to be threatened, with a
considerable loss of jobs will obtain protection easier than
other industries.- 37 -
Such differences can be modeled with industry specific para-







The last variant emphasizes the efficiency of an industry's
lobbying. The relative efficiency of money spent in lobbying
by an industry will be determined by a scaling factor
K .
K = — with K.=1 w.l.o.g., such that
An increase in K will then represent rising efficiency of
industry i or - equiyalently - falling efficiency of indu-
stry j and vice versa for a decrease in K.
We will begin the derivation of the comparative static re-
sults with the last case. The first order conditions for a
profit maximum and implicit reaction functions are
3TT . 3x .
-+— p * K - 1 = 0
9 IT . 3 T .
3 p —1 - 1 = 0.
3p.(1+t.)
 J 3m.- 38 -
A marginal increase in K will shift the reaction function of
industry j R.(m.,m.,ic) to the left, since








 J 3m.3^ 3[p
The shift of R. (m. ,m ., K) , however, is indeterminate,
dm. _, 3TT. 3T. m.
i. _ " -*• r ± Q ^- ^. i. A 1 <
since A.<0.
The changes in the Nash-equilibrium levels of lobbying,
dmf/dic and dm^/dic, are easily determined, if R. is shifted
to the right, i.e. dm./doO.
Then
dm*
^-i > 0 and d<
If, however, the reaction function R. is shifted downward
the sign of the equilibrium changes of lobbying expenditures
is indeterminate. We will show graphically the possible
18 configurations. In Figure 8 E represents the initial
equilibrium. If R. is shifted upward to R"!" we get the result
mentioned above with m.<m. and m . >m. . The new equilibrium E..
lies to the north-west of E as long as R. does not fall so
far such that the intersection with R. falls below the line
m?E . If the intersection of R. with R. lies below m?E and
to the left of E m? both m* and m* fall. Finally, if the
intersection is to the right of E m., like E-, then m* falls
and m^ rises as a consequence of increased relative effi-




The changes in the optimal level of lobbying expenditures do
not show directly the resulting effects on the tariff rate.
In Figure 8 the dotted lines t. and t. represent the combi-
nations of (m.,m.) resulting in a specific tariff rate t -
one may call them "iso-tariff lines". If the new equilibrium
lies above (below) t., the tariff rate of industry i will
rise (fall). For industry 'j the case is just opposite; for
an equilibrium below (above) t. the tariff rate t. will rise
(fall).
The reason for such counterintuitive results can be found in
the possibility of a decline in the marginal product of
lobbying. This will lead to a reduction of lobbying. But it
also has repercussions on the commodity decisions, since it- 40 -
depends on the domestic price. A reduction in lobbying and a
decline of the tariff rate happens, if the reduction in
lobby costs is larger than the resulting loss of commodity
revenues, i.e. profits still rise.
We now turn to the second case, changes in the political
preferences towards specific sectors. This model is symme-
tric with respect to the protection functions of the two
industries, so that we can analyse w.l.o.g. a change in K.
only. The shifts in the reaction function of industry i is
determined as
_D i
dm. *i 9m. 3IT . 3
2TT .
P.t. ] > 0,
i.e. R. is shifted upward. Since the reaction functions of
industry j R.(m.,m.,K.) is not a function of K., it will not
] i j j i
be affected by a change in <.. The Nash-equilibrium changes
follwo then easily from a graphical representation of the
shifts. A rise in K. will increase the optimal lobbying of
industry i, mt, and decrease that of industry j, m
1*. The
tariff rates go in the same direction, i.e. dtt/dic. >0,
dtVd<.<0. The graphical representation is the same as for
changes in the commodity production technology in Figure 8.
The last case to be investigated represents changes in the
overall political climate towards protection. I.e. increases
in n are equivalent to a shift towards a more protectionist
position of the society. Again, we skip the optimization and
state immediately the effects of a change in p on the reac-
tion function R. and R..- 41 -
Hie
dm,
 Pk 3m, 3TT, 3
2TT,
—£ = is [ is— + is P t ] > o,
dy Ak 9Pkd+t) 3[pd+t)]
2
Both reaction functions are shifted upward. The new equili-
brium has either increased lobbying expenditures for both
industries or increased lobbying in one and reduced lobbying
in the other industry. The change in the optimal tariff
rates (t*,^) can not be determined without further speci-
fications of the model.
The qualitative results of the independent industry case
also hold for the second case where industry j uses protec-
ted inputs of industry i and only lobbies for protection of
its output x. but not against protection of x.. To see this









Whereas the situation for industry i remains the same, one
can see that, compared to the previous model, changes in m.
or m. have exaggerated effects for industry j. Take for
example an increase in m.. Protection t. will rise and t.
will fall; in addition, input prices for industry j will
rise'as well, leading to a further reduction of profits. The
opposite affect have increases in m.. These considerations
already show, that the qualitative results of the "indepen-
dant-industry" model remain the same. Derivation of the
comparative static effects along the same lines as in the
previous model confirm these results as well.- 42 -
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The determination of protection has widely been viewed as a.
market process. On a political market for protection politi-
cians, government, or bureaucrats supply tariff or non-ta-
riff barriers against foreign competitors in exchange for
monetary and nonmonetary contributions. On the other side
companies in an industry form lobbies, who express the de-
mand for protection and buy it on that market. In this paper
the supply side has not been modeled explicitly, but was
given by a tariff supply function, i.e. the cost curve for
tariffs or the tariff production function which had incorpo-
rated the features assumed about the decision of politicians
or governments.
In the first model the relation between commodity production
and lobbying decisions was investigated. Since the lobby
decision was assumed to follow the objective of profit maxi-
mization, there must be a close relationship between the.
commodity and the political side through the domestic commo-
dity price. By making the lobby decision endogenous this
interrelation can be examined in a comparative static ana-;
lysis.
The comparative statics show, that the optimal lobbying
decision depends on the profitability of the commodity side.
Contrary to the widely held belief that industries, whose
comparative advantage vis-a-vis the rest of the world has
deteriorated, choose between efforts to regain their compa-
rative advantage internally and lobbying for protection, it
is shown that falling world market prices will induce less
lobbying and - other things as the political situation being
equal - a lower tariff rate. This happens, although the
ratio of imports to domestic consumption rises even at a
constant tariff rate. In the same direction go changes in- 43 -
the production technology. At a given world market price
with improving technology production costs will fall, hence
production will increase, thus reducing imports and increas-
ing profits. At the same time the surplus from lobbying has
increased also violating the equality of marginal costs and
marginal surplus of lobbying. Consequently lobbying is in-
creased until equality is restored.
The situation, when there are several lobbies, is conside-
rably complicated through the need to model the interdepen-
dence of lobbies on the political market as well as that of
industries on the commodity markets. As long as industries
are only lobbying for but not against protection of some
commodity, the reaction functions of lobbying have negative
slopes for both industries, i.e. lobbying expenditures of
industries are inversely related. Also the Nash-equilibrium
lobbying will react inversely. Any exogenous function of one
industry will increase the optimal lobbying expenditures of
that industry and reduce those of the other industries.
Therefore the comparative static results of the first model
hold for most of the direct effects of the many industry
case. The cross-effects have the opposite sign, since any
improvement in the comparative advantage of an industry on
the political market will deteriorate the position of the
other industry.
Only for exogenous changes affecting the tariff functions T.
and T. the results are not all clear-cut. Changes in the
sectoral bias toward protection of politicians are as expec-
ted from the one-industry model. A change in the protective
bias towards industry i will increase lobbying as well as
tariff rates of that industry, whereas tariff rates and
optimal lobbying of industry j will be reduced, and vice
versa. When, for some reason, the overall political climate
with respect to granting protection deteriorates, it is very- 44 -
likely, but not necessary, that both industries reduce their
lobbying expenditures. They will not increase them, since
both reaction functions are shifted downwards.
It can not be determined, how the tariff rates react to the
reduction in lobbying. Both rates could go either way. The
analysis of changes in the relative efficiency of lobbying
expenditures on the tariff rate will very likely lead to
higher tariff rates of the industry experiencing higher
efficiency. The sign of the changes of lobbying expenditures
is not predictable on this level of abstraction.
What does the several-industry case tell with respect to the
cost of protection? Since most comparative static effects
have opposite signs on the two industries, we know from the
one-industry model, that the social costs of protection in
one industry will rise while they will fall in the other
industry. Such diverging effects indicate some insensitivity
of changes in the social costs of protection with respect to
parameter changes outside the political market, i.e. world
market prices or production technology. Only for some chan-
ges in political parameters one can expect unidirectional
effects on social costs.
The results obtained in this paper are surprising in that
they contradict widely held believes about the determinants
of protection. These beliefs may be based on the notion that
industries react to exogenous changes in their environment
either through internal adjustments such as improving pro-
ductivity or through external means such as obtaining pro-
tection from competitors. They could be explained by the use
of an insufficient analysis of the metaphors used to explain
the existence of protection. The "political market for pro-
19 tection" is one such metaphor employed to organize and
interprete an otherwise too complex reality. McCLOSKEY
(1983) has investigated advantages and disadvantages of the- 45 -
20
metaphorical character of economics . "An important meta-
phor in economics has the quality admired in a successful
scientific theory, a capacity to astonish us with implica-
tions yet unseen" [McCLOSKEY (1983), 503-4]. The verdict on
the metaphor of a political market for protection will and
can not be brought by us, but by empirical tests and scien-
tific discourse.
Prior empirical work using a political market for protection
such as ANDERSON/BALDWIN's (1981) collection of studies do
not explicitly incorporate the features of our model. How-
ever, for some variables they predict signs which would not
be supported by our model. Fortunately for us, the empirical
estimations do not show conclusive signs. Only an explicit




The supply functions x(p) and x (p) for the maximization
problem
max p(l+t)x - c(x) - s(t)
x,t
with c(x) and s(t) convex and at least twice differentiable
are increasing in p resp. p.
Proof:
x*(p) is the solution of the system (2) and (3)
(2) p(l+t*) - c
1(x*) = 0
(3) px* - s' (t*) = 0.
Since the objective function is strictly concave, (x*,t*) is









= c" (x*)s" (t*)-p




1) = > 0.
dp c"(x*)s"(t*)-p
2
The slope of the supply function x (p) with p=p(l+t*) is
determined from







For all p > 0
x*(p) > x
p(l+t*) > p.
x*(p) > xQ(p) and
Proof:
By the concavity of the objective function Tr(x,t) (x*,t*) is
an interior solution for p>0 and therefore for t* >0. Hence
p(l+t*)>p.
xQ(p) = {x | p = c
1 (x)}
x*(p) = (x | p = °|ff , t* = argmax Tr(x,t)}
Since t*>0 and since c'(x) is increasing in x by convexity
of c(x) we get
x*(p) > x (p) for all p>o.||- 48 -
PROPOSITION 2:
Given the maximization problem
max Tr(x,t) = max p(l+t)x - c(x) - s(t)
x,t x,t
where c(x) and s(t) are convex and at least twice differen-
tiable functions. Suppose a unique maximum exists, then
T - s(t*) > 0,
where T = p(l+t*)x* - px - c(x*) + c(x )
and
(x*,t*) = argmax w(x,t),
x = argmax TT (X) = argmax px - c(x)
Proof:
T - s(t*) = p(l+t*)x* - px - c(x*) + c(x*) + c(x ) - s(t*)
= ir(x*,t*) - TT(XQ) .
If IT (x* , t*) <u (x ), then t*=0 and t\ (x*, 0) =TT (X ), a contradic-





T(p)-s[t*(p) ]=p[l+t*(p) ]x*(p)-pxo(p)-c[x*(p) ]
+c[xQ(p)]-s[t*(p)]






by using the first order conditions and LEMMA 1- 50 -
PROPOSITION 3:
Given the maximization problem
max 7r(x,t) = max p(l+t)x - c(x) - s(t)
x, t x,t
where c(x) and l(t) are convex and at least twice differen-















2 and x* and t* denote the optimal values of
max TT (x, t) .
x,t
A>0 by the existence of a maximum. s">0 by convexity of
s(t) . Hence ^— > 0. dp- 51 -
b.) By the same arguments one gets
dt* _ c"x"+p(t*+l)
dp " A
c.) T was defined as
T = p(l+t*)x* - pxQ - c(x*)-+
then
c 3p 3p
Using the first-order conditions this reduces to
J£ = (l+t*)x* + px* 1^- - x > 0, dp
 3P o '
since |^ > 0 by b.) and x* > XQ by LEMMA 1.
d . ds(t*) = 3s(t*) 8t* > 0
by b.) and the convexity of s(t)
e.) See LEMMA 2.I I- 52 -
PROPOSITION 4:
Given the maximization problem
max p(l+t)x - hx - gt
x,t











a.) By Cramer's Rule
dx* = 1_ h
 p -s"c'
dh ~ A ' Q _sll hA
where A =c"s" - p
2 > 0 and
9c' _ Bahx""
1 _ a-1 _ c'
Th 8h ~ F" "
< 0.



















The second equation follows from the first-order conditions
and since
3c(x,h) _ ^hx_ 6 c(x,h)
3h 9h
dt*
—r— is negative. x*>x together with the assumption, that
c(x) is increasing in x, yields c(x*)-c(x )>0. Therefore T
is decreasing in a.
3t* _ -s'c'
dh 3t 3h hA
d(T-s(t*) = -s'c' _ 1 c _
•' dh hA h
 Lcl
x ' s'c
= - i [c(x*) - c(xQ)]- 54 -
PROPOSITION 5:
Given the maximization problem
ct 6
max p(l+t)x - hx - gt
x,t













X dg ~ ^A
 <
ds(t*) = 9s(g,') 9s(t*,')




d(T-s(t*)) pxc"s' s'c"s' 8





Since the computation of a.)-e.) follows the same procedures
as in PROPOSITION 4, it is omitted. II- 55 -
PROPOSITION 6;










Then R.(m.,m.) and R.(m.,m.) have negative slope,
Proof:
Total Differentiation of R. yields
3
2TT. 3t. 3t. 3TT. 3
2t.
, 1 l l . , li
pi
 l3[p(l+t) P
 pi dm 9m 3p
dm i
 l3[pi(l+ti) P
 pi dmi 9m. 3pi(lti) SnKSm.
and for R. one gets
3









Both, A. and A. are negative by the second-order condition
for a profit maximum. For the numerators we have (k=i,j)
3
2TT
> 0, ,r * ,12 > 0 3pk(l+tk)





by the assumption of a Downsian politician or government,
PROPOSITION 7:





















3x* 3t. 3t. 3
2t.
1 p? 1 1 + x*p. 3_
3p. ^ 3m. 3m.




In a stabil equilibrium A>0. Now by Cramer's Rule
3t* 3t* dm* -A. 3x*
—i = —1 [--i p (1+tJ) —- + x* —-
dp. A 3p. 3m. 3m.- 57 -
since A>0, and A.<0 by the second-order condition for a
maximum of industry j. fix./6p.>0 by the convexity of ?r.(p.)
and 9t./3m.>=0 by assumption.
dm* . 3x* 8t. 8t.
1 ^ Pd+tt) —- + x* —i
9m 3m






1 8m. 3m. -
1 am.3m.
< o,
since the terms in the first bracket are all positive and
both terms in the second bracket have one negative
partial.||
PROPOSITION 8:
Let the reaction function R, (a, ,m.,m.), k=i,j, be defined as
K -K 1 . j
k k
R, (a,fm. ,m.) = a p 1 = 0.


















since A <0, by suffiency, A>0 by stability of the equili-
brium. The bracket is positive, since all terms are positive
except for the last term.






1 r n - n v n T LP "S I"* -







since the last bracket is negative, whereas the first





























R. (m. ,m . , K) =
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i p <m (—i-) 2
3p.
6T. m.
± + -i A > 0
For the first part of the Lemma we get
dm*
i
6R. 6R. 6R. dm . 6R. 6R. 6R.
i _ I ri "l i A -i
d< ~ A
 LTHT Tic 6K j
J'
where A is the Hessian Determinant with A>0 by the stability
condition. Since the first element of the difference in the
bracket is positive and A.<0, the desired result follows
immediately. The second part of the Lemma follows equiva-
lent ly:
dm* 1 6R. 6R. 6R.
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Scientific Tariff", in: The Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. .68, No. 4, 327. ...
2 Op. cit., 327-345.
3 Op. cit., 331-332.
4 Gordon Tullock (1967), "The Welfare Costs of Tariffs,
Monopolies, and Theft", in: Western Economic Journal, Vol.
V, No. 3, 228.
Anne 0. Krueger (1974) , "The Political Economy of the
Rent-Seeking Society", in: American Economic Review, Vol.
64, No. 6, 293.
Rachel McCulloch (1979), "Trade and Direct Investment:
Recent Policy Trends", in: Riidiger Dornbush and Jacob A..
Frenkel (eds.), "International Economic Policy - Theory
and Evidence", The Johns Hopkins University Press, Balti-
more, 83.
7 See, e.g., ANDERSON/BALDWIN (1981), CAVES (1976), GLIS-
MANN/WEISS (1980).
8
Without doubt, a convex cost-function of lobbying would
come out of the model. One could obtain better information
as to the political parameters determining the functional
form of such a cost-function.
In the terminology of Anderson/Baldwin (1981) the
question would be: How are marginal lobbying costs and
marginal producer surplus equated?- 62 -
This assumption seems to be supported by casual observa-
tion of the media, where such conflicts - at least until
recently - have not been observed.
Compensation may become impossible for a dramatic in-
crease in the consumer price level. But this is not empi-
rically relevant for the last decades in industrialised
countries.
Of course, with positive fixed costs one has to take care
of possible discontinuities at low lobbying levels.
The proof is in the appendix, PROPOSITION 6.
1
4 See e.g. MOULIN (1981).
For a proof see Theorem II-3 in LAU (1978), pg. 154.
For the exact derivation see PROPOSITION 8 in the appen-
dix.
See LEMMA 3 in the appendix.
18
The formal conditions are given in LEMMA 3.
19
If one considers recent reports on the intermingling
interests of politicians, and industry, one could become
doubtful as to whether the metaphor has turned into rea-
lity.
And all other sciences, of course.- 63 -
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